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MAKING INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
WORK FOR ALL: ADDRESSING THE 
DEFICITS IN ACCESS TO REMEDY FOR 
WRONGED HOST STATE CITIZENS 
THROUGH INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
EMMANUEL T. LARYEA* 
Abstract: The current dominant system for resolving international investment dis-
putes is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement system or, more precisely, the Inves-
tor-State Arbitration system (ISA). The ISA system has proved to be an effective 
avenue for remedy for foreign investors whose investments are wrongfully im-
paired by host states. However, the system is not accessible to Host State Citizens 
(HSCs) whose interests may be harmed by investors. Wronged HSCs can seek re-
dress in domestic fora only. The domestic fora in many jurisdictions leave many 
wronged HSCs without remedy, a problem that has long been acknowledged. This 
Essay proposes a solution. It proposes that access to remedy for wronged HSCs can 
be operationalized within the existing arbitration system (or integrated into a future 
international investment court system that may eventuate). This can be achieved by 
expanding the current ISA system to be a more inclusive system that allows all af-
fected persons—investors and non-investors—whose interests are adversely affect-
ed to seek remedy. The proposed system, termed Investment Related Dispute Set-
tlement, would allow for: (1) traditional ISA proceedings, in which investors may 
initiate proceedings against host states; (2) HSG-Investor Arbitration, in which host 
state governments may initiate proceedings against investors; and (3) HSCs-
Investor Arbitration, in which HSCs may initiate arbitral proceedings against inves-
tors. 
INTRODUCTION 
 There are several deficiencies in the current system for settling interna-
tional investment related disputes, which has led to backlash against the sys-
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tem.1 The dominant mechanism for settling investment disputes is Investor 
State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”).2 Broadly defined, ISDS includes any tech-
nique for settling investment disputes. This encompasses litigation in domestic 
or foreign courts, domestic or international arbitration, mediation, conciliation 
and negotiation. But, the term ISDS has become synonymous with investor–
state arbitration (“ISA”).  
  ISA is usually a way for foreign investors (often a corporation or a pri-
vate individual) to challenge a law, regulation, judicial or administrative ruling, 
or other government decision, in front of private arbitrators vested with the 
authority to make decisions and give binding, enforceable awards.3 Critics 
have voiced many concerns about the ISA system.4 The criticisms of ISA have 
led to backlash against it.5 They have also led to some reform efforts.6 
                                                                                                                           
1 See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 
(Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Raphael Lencucha, Is It Time to Say Farewell to the ISDS System?: 
Comment on “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Is It Everything We Feared for Health?,” 6 INT’L J. 
HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 289, 289 (2017) (discussing criticisms and proposed reforms of ISDS in the 
area of health policy); Chief Justice Robert Shenton French, Chief Justice of Australia, ISDS—Litigating 
the Judiciary, Address at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Centenary Conference (Mar. 21, 2015), 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj21mar15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2DSM-DVWV] (discussing the relationship between the ISDS tribunals and domestic 
courts). 
2 Although investment disputes may be resolved by litigation, mediation, conciliation, negotia-
tion, or arbitration, for reasons explained under ‘Development of ISA’ (in Part I) below, parties often 
choose arbitration over the other mechanisms. See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text. As ex-
plained there, the purpose of developing ISDS was to establish an international system of neutral 
forum that would assuage the concerns of investors (capital exporters) and encourage them to invest in 
developing countries with perceived weak judicial systems and governance. Consequently, investors 
have come to prefer ISAs to the other mechanisms of settling investment disputes. Some investors 
have even sought to bypass provisions in investments agreements that require them to seek resolution 
by one or more of the other mechanisms before ISAs. See generally Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000) (finding claimant, an 
Argentine national, could bypass a requirement in the Argentina-Spain Bilateral Investment Treaty 
that disputes must first be submitted to the domestic courts of the host state before they can be submit-
ted to an ISA tribunal). 
3 Lisa Crawford, Patrick Emerton & Emmanuel Laryea, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the 
Australian Constitutional Framework, in THE CHINA-AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A 21ST 
CENTURY MODEL 259, 260 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Laryea et al., ISDS and the 
Australian Constitutional Framework]. 
4 Some of the criticisms are that ISA enhances the power of multinational corporations at the ex-
pense of national sovereignty and interests. The argument is that ISA curtails the ability of govern-
ments to adopt laws and regulations in the national interest because they may be challenged before a 
panel of private arbitrators, who may award damages against the state. So too, the criticism goes, does 
ISA allow judicial decisions in sovereign states to be challenged before private arbitrators, who might 
not be trained judges. ISA tribunals are also perceived to interpret the laws in favor of-investors, ra-
ther than in a balanced manner, to the disadvantage of sovereign states. Another criticism is that, with 
prospects of claims by investors against the host state before perceived pro-investor tribunals if the 
state adopts laws and regulations that affect investors adversely, host state governments may refrain 
from implementing legitimate policies that may trigger ISA claims (this is often referred to as “regula-
tory chill”). The system is also criticized for lacking in transparency and diversity since it involves a 
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 This Essay contributes to the reform effort by proposing a new arbitration 
system that addresses the criticism that the ISA system protects only investors’ 
interests to the exclusion of both host states’ interests and other affected per-
sons’ interests because only investors are allowed to initiate claims.7 This is a 
major deficiency in the current ISA system specifically and international in-
vestment law (“IIL”) generally. In particular, the lack of room within the IIL 
regime for wronged host state citizens (“HSCs”)8 to obtain remedy is of great 
concern.9  
                                                                                                                           
small pool of mostly male practitioners who sometimes act in different capacities (being arbitrators in 
some cases and then appearing as counsel before their fellow arbitrators in other cases). The system is 
said to challenge core constitutional law values, such as the principle of democracy, the concept of the 
rule of law, and the protection of fundamental or human rights. Another criticism is that the ISA sys-
tem protects only investors’ interests, to the exclusion the interests of both host states and other affect-
ed persons, because only investors can initiate claims. For a discussion of the criticisms, see Laryea et 
al., ISDS and the Australian Constitutional Framework, supra note 3, at 262–63 (citing Chief Justice 
Robert Shenton French, Chief Justice of Australia, Investor-State Dispute Settlement—A Cut Above 
the Courts?, Address at the Supreme and Federal Courts Judges' Conference (July 9, 2014), 
www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj09jul14.pdf] 
[https://perma.cc/DNB3-XF27]). See generally Rudolf Dolzer, Perspectives for Investment Arbitra-
tion: Consistency as a Policy Goal? 11 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 403 (2014); EUROPEAN FED’N FOR 
INV. LAW & ARBITRATION, A RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS AGAINST ISDS (May 17, 2015), https://efila.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the-criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/R7FD-5RQC]); Press Release, EU–US Trade Negotiations (TTIP): Investor Dispute 
Mechanism Trojan Horse Must be Excluded from TTIP, Greens/European Free Alliance in the Euro-
pean Parliament (Jan. 21, 2014), www.greens-efa.eu/eu-us-trade-negotiations-ttip-11492.html [https://
perma.cc/5ZZ8-82VJ]. 
5 Leon E. Trakman & David Musayelyan, The Repudiation of Investor-State Arbitration and Sub-
sequent Treaty Practice: The Resurgence of Qualified Investor-State Arbitration, 31 ICSID REV. 194, 
194–95 (2016). 
6 See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., REFORMING INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: IN SEARCH OF A ROADMAP (2013),  http://unctad.org/en/Publications
Library/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ8U-V3HS] (analyzing ISDS reform proposals 
that address ISDS criticisms); Piero Bernardini, Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The 
Need to Balance Both Parties’ Interests, 32 ICSID REV. 38 (2017) (analyzing a system proposed by 
the European Commission to replace ISDS); Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor–State Dispute 
Settlement: A (Comparative and International) Constitutional Law Framework, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
649 (2017) (discussing criticisms of ISDS and proposals for its reform). 
7 Schill, supra note 6, at 3. 
8 HSCs should be understood to mean people (individuals and collectives) who are adversely af-
fected by international investment activities. They may be indigenous or non-indigenous, formally 
recognized or not. “Citizens” is used here broadly to encompass both nationals and non-national resi-
dents in the host state or abroad. Arguably, non-residents are unlikely to be adversely affected by 
activities in the host state. However, non-residents may own property the value of which is heavily 
diminished by investment related activity, such as pollution of land. 
9 See Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on Improving Access to 
Remedy in the Area of Business and Human Rights at the EU Level, at 18 (Apr. 10, 2017), http://
fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2017/business-human-rights [https://perma.cc/YQ79-PSUW] (advising 
“which EU action could be undertaken for the right to a remedy to be improved in cases of business-
related human rights abuse”); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Access to Remedy 
for Business-Related Human Rights Abuses (Consultation Draft), U.N. Doc. A/32/10, at 2 (Jan. 2018), 
 
2848 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2845 
 This Essay argues that access to remedy for wronged HSCs can either be 
operationalized within the existing arbitral system of dispute resolution or in-
tegrated into a future international investment court system that may eventuate 
in its place or operate parallel to the ISA. The Essay focuses on access to rem-
edy through the existing arbitral system, but the thrust of the analysis is appli-
cable to an international investment court, if one eventuates. The arbitral ac-
cess can be achieved by expanding the current ISA system, which is currently 
used only by investors against host states, to a more inclusive system that al-
lows all affected persons—investors and non-investors—whose interests are 
adversely affected to seek remedy. The proposed system, termed Investment 
Related Dispute Settlement (“IRDS”), would allow for (1) traditional ISA pro-
ceedings, in which investors may initiate proceedings against host states; (2) 
HSG-Investor Arbitration (“HGIA”), in which host state governments 
(“HSGs”) may initiate proceedings against investors; and (3) HSCs-Investor 
Arbitration (“HCIA”), in which HSCs may initiate arbitral proceedings against 
investors. 
 ISA is already widely known and practiced; and as of December 31, 2017, 
there were at least 855 publicly known treaty-based ISA cases.10 It has been 
observed by other scholars that the current ISA system already allows for 
HGIA, though host states rarely initiate proceedings against investors in prac-
tice.11 Thus, this Essay’s discussion will focus on HCIA, which has, to-date, 
been missing. 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/ARP_II_Consultation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZU9L-5P69] (containing policy objectives “aimed at helping [UN Member] States 
strengthen . . . [a]ccess to Remedy for business-related human rights abuses”); infra notes 28–69 and 
accompanying text (discussing further examples of access to remedy problems faced by wronged 
HSCs in countries such as Cambodia and Nigeria). 
10 Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD: INVESTMENT POLICY HUB (Dec. 31, 
2017), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS [https://perma.cc/XZ7N-THTE]. This is in addi-
tion to non-treaty based ISAs. See, e.g., Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Invs. Ctr. & 
Gov’t of Ghana, 95 I.L.R. 184 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1990). Treaty-based ISA claims are those in which the 
claims are based on alleged breaches of International Investment Agreements (“IIAs”). IIAs are trea-
ties between two or more states covering investment relationships between nationals or other identifi-
able entities of one state in the jurisdiction of the other. It may be specifically for investments or be 
contained, usually as a chapter, in a broader International Economic Agreement covering, not just 
investment but also trade, between the state parties and their nationals. It may be bilateral (i.e. be-
tween two states), regional (often between a few countries in a geographical area), or between coun-
tries in dispersed regions that share a common goal in investment promotion and regulation. Non-
treaty claims are those in which the claims are based on breaches of contract or customary internation-
al law, because there is no IIA between claimant’s home state and the host state. In Biloune, the 
claimant’s home state, which is Syria, did not have an IIA with Ghana, and so his claim was based on 
Ghana’s breach of contract and customary international law. The claimant was successful. 
11 See, e.g., CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH & ANTHONY 
SINCLAIR, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 458 (2d ed. 2009). The authors observed that, 
in theory, either host states or investors may request ICSID arbitration; however, in practice, investors 
usually make the request. See generally id. 
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 Part I of this Essay provides a brief background on ISA.12 Part II discuss-
es the lack of access to remedies for non-investors, particularly HSCs, who are 
wronged by investment activities.13 Part III discusses the problems with, and 
the undesirability of, the lack of access to remedy for HSCs.14 This discussion 
will provide useful context for understanding Part IV’s examination of both the 
changes that would be required to move from an ISA system to an IRDS sys-
tem and how the IRDS system would operate.15 The proposed IRDS system 
will address the specific criticism of ISA mentioned above, help to balance the 
rights and interests of all affected parties, enhance the legitimacy of the system 
that is often called into question,16 improve the foreign investment climate for 
businesses and states, and work for all. Nevertheless, I anticipate concerns and 
objections to the IRDS system, many of which may be underpinned by the 
concepts that have left the deficiencies unaddressed. These include the appli-
cable law that determines substantive rights of affected interests and the inves-
tors’ consent to arbitrate. I will, therefore, examine and address those potential 
concerns and objections at the end of this Essay. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISA SYSTEM17 
ISA is a system that allows an investor (often a corporation or a private 
individual) to use dispute settlement proceedings against a foreign govern-
ment. The concept of ISA was created by the International Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes of 1965 (“ICSID Convention”).18 The IC-
SID Convention provides a procedural framework for dispute settlement be-
tween host states and foreign investors through conciliation or arbitration. It 
                                                                                                                           
12 See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 28–69 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 70–98 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 99–120 and accompanying text. 
16 See, e.g., Julius Cosmas, Legitimacy Crisis in Investor-State International Arbitration System: 
A Critique on the Suggested Solutions & the Proposal on the Way Forward, 4 INT’L J. SCI. & RES. 
PUBL’NS 1 (2014) (“It is contended that the [ISA] system is overshadowed with flaws and lacks the 
necessary values of a legitimate adjudicative system.”); Frank J. Garcia, Lindita Ciko, Apurv Gaurav 
& Kirrin Hough, Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade 
Law, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 861 (2015) (“Investment law today is undergoing a . . . legitimacy 
crisis . . . particularly with respect to . . . investor-State arbitration.”); Jane Kelsey, The Crisis of Legit-
imacy in International Investment Agreements and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, JUDICIAL POW-
ER PROJECT (Jan. 9, 2018), https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/jane-kelsey-the-crisis-of-legitimacy-in-
international-investment-agreements-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/REL5-
G2ET] (“This essay . . . set[s] out the broad-church criticisms of ISDS that have provoked a crisis of 
legitimacy in the investment arbitration regime.”). 
17 Portions of this section also appear in my prior work, Laryea et al., Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement and the Australian Constitutional Framework, supra note 3. 
18 Id. at 260 (citing Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Spe-
cies of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 129 (2006)). 
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established a center, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (“ICSID Centre”), that acts as an arbitral forum for the settlement of in-
ternational investment disputes between investors of one contracting state (the 
home state) and the government of another contracting state (the host state). 
Up until the promulgation of the ICSID Convention, developing countries 
asserted that jurisdiction in international investment disputes lay with the host 
state.19 Beyond that, foreign investors had to resort to customary international 
law (“CIL”) for the settlement of disputes between them and foreign (host 
state) governments.20 However, under CIL, sovereigns are immune to suits by 
private entities for actions taken by a government in pursuit of its administra-
tive functions.21 Thus, if the actions of a host government injured a foreign 
national, the injured party would have to rely on its home government to seek 
redress on its behalf and the home government may exercise diplomatic pro-
tection rights on behalf of its injured national abroad. 
Developed (capital exporting) countries had concerns about the quality 
and independence of the laws, governments, and judiciaries of developing 
countries. Capital exporters also saw obvious limitations to the effectiveness of 
using CIL. For instance, the home government might not be keen to antagonize 
the foreign government; the decision by the home government to intervene 
might require a lot of politicking; the remedies that may be sought, or accept-
ed, by the home government might not be what the injured party wants; and, 
the process might take unduly long.22 Thus, capital exporters preferred some 
form of independent forum under international law.23 
At the time, the opposing positions between developing (capital import-
ing) countries and developed (capital exporting) countries on fora for settling 
investment disputes (as well as on the substantive law regarding standard of 
protection for foreign investments and compensation for injury to foreign in-
vestors) were considered to discourage capital exporters from investing in de-
veloping economies.24 
                                                                                                                           
19 Id. at 261 (citing Emmanuel Laryea, Evolution of International Investment Law and Implica-
tions for Africa, in NATURAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 293, 298–300 
(Francis N. Botchway ed. 2011); Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law—A 
Return to the Gay Nineties?, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 12, 16–17 (2007)). 
20 Id. (citing RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT LAW 232 (2d ed. 2012)). 
 21 Id. This stems from the principle of state sovereignty. In its basic form, state sovereignty is the 
right to exercise, within a territory, the functions of a state exclusive to any other state or kingdom, 
and subject to no other authority. In practice, such exclusive authority may be limited by obligations 
under international law. Id. at n.7. 
22 Id. (citing DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 20, at 232). 
23 Id. (citing Michael Brandon, Recent Measures to Improve the International Investment Cli-
mate, 9 J. PUB. L. 125, 126–31 (1960)). 
24 Id. (citing Laryea, supra note 19, at 298–300). 
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ICSID was conceived as an independent international forum that would 
assuage the concerns of capital exporters and encourage them to invest in de-
veloping countries with (perceived) weak judicial systems and governance. 
Ratification of the ICSID Convention by developing countries was to serve as 
a kind of insurance to potential investors that they would have recourse to the 
ICSID Centre’s independent dispute resolution mechanism if the host state 
government undermined the property rights of the investor. As observed in 
2005 in Gas Natural SDS v. Argentine Republic, the independent international 
dispute resolution mechanisms such as ICSIDs “offered to investors assurances 
that disputes that might flow from their investments would not be subject to 
the perceived hazards of delays and political pressures of adjudication in na-
tional courts.”25 The tribunal felt “that assurances of independent international 
arbitration is an important—perhaps the most important—element in investor 
protections.”26 
ISA practice has now developed beyond ICSID. Most IIAs provide for 
ISA, at ICSID or elsewhere, as a mechanism for settling disputes between for-
eign investors and host state governments. And, many ISA cases take place 
under the auspices of international arbitral tribunals governed by non-ICSID 
rules and/or institutions, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration, 
and the International Chamber of Commerce. As noted earlier, as of December 
31, 2017, there were at least 855 publicly known treaty-based ISAs.27 
II. ISA AND LACK OF ACCESS TO REMEDY FOR NON-INVESTOR PARTIES 
The ISA system was conceptualized and developed to serve as an investor 
protection mechanism.28 It was designed as a response to the “perceived haz-
ards of delays” and politically compromised national courts of the host state to 
which investors could be subject.29 The ISA system instead provided investors 
with a reputable, independent, international forum for settling “disputes that 
                                                                                                                           
25 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Jurisdiction, ¶ 29 
(June 17, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0354.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XK59-MJ2L]. 
26 Laryea et al., ISDS and the Australian Constitutional Framework, supra note 3, at 262 (citing 
Gas Natural SDG, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Jurisdiction, ¶ 29). 
27 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
28 See supra notes 18–27 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and development of the 
ISA system); see also Upendra D. Acharya, Globalization and Hegemony Shift: Are States Merely 
Agents of Corporate Capitalism?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 937, 952–53 (2013) (“The treaties establishing the 
[ICSID Centre] have been branded ‘bills of rights for foreign investors’ as part of an international 
legal framework that forces non-hegemon sovereign states to be accountable to corporations.”). 
29 Gas Natural SDG, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Jurisdiction, ¶ 29. 
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might flow from their investments” abroad.30 But, because of its genesis, the 
ISA system today only benefits investors. 
The focus on investor protection has meant that non-investors whose in-
terests are adversely affected by investment activities are left with only the 
domestic fora that are perceived to be inadequate for the investor. Thus, while 
investors are shielded from the hazards of domestic systems of law by the ISA 
mechanism, those whose interests have been adversely affected by the activi-
ties of the investor are left to resort to the lax domestic system.  
Worse yet, investors can, and sometimes do, take advantage of the lax 
domestic system to operate in a manner they would not in their home state or 
other jurisdictions of strong laws and institutions. An example is the operations 
of the British–Dutch multinational oil and gas giant, Royal Dutch Shell PLC 
(“Shell”) in Nigeria. Shell has been flaring gas, spilling oil, and polluting 
lands, waterways and habitats in Nigeria’s Niger Delta area for decades.31 
Shell will not, and cannot, operate in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United 
States or other developed countries the way it does in Nigeria and get away 
with it for this long.  The extent of devastation that Shell’s operations have 
caused the environment and the inhabitants of the Niger Delta area would like-
ly have resulted in billions of dollars in fines, compensation payments, and 
clean-up expenses had this harm been inflicted in a developed country. To give 
an example of what would have happened in a developed country, oil spillage 
following a well blowout at the site of British Petroleum PLC’s (BP) Deep-
water Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 cost it over $61 bil-
lion in fines, compensations, and clean-up expenses. 32 BP’s market capitaliza-
tion immediately before the accident was $180 billion, but “[t]he accident ac-
tually shaved off one-third of the market capitalization of the company” after 
the accident.33 As oil analyst Fadel Gheit put it, “[i]t’s a miracle that the com-
pany is still in business”34 after the spill. Yet, Shell’s persistent spills, gas flar-
ing, and pollution in Nigeria has cost it little, if at all. Shell is one of many for-
                                                                                                                           
30 Id. 
 31 See, e.g., High Court Blocks Nigeria Oil Spill Case Against Shell, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/high-court-blocks-nigeria-oil-spill-case-shell-17012613
2912975.html [https://perma.cc/7HGJ-AEH5]. Thousands of residents of Nigeria's Niger Delta region 
commenced legal action against Shell, demanding action over decades of oil spills there that the 
claimants argued had devastated their lives, harmed the environment, and caused diseases. 
 32 Steven Mufson, BP’s Bill for the World’s Largest Oil Spill Now Reaches $81 Billion, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD NEWSPAPER (July 15, 2016), https://www.smh.com.au/business/bps-bill-for-the-
worlds-largest-oil-spill-now-reaches-81-billion-20160715-gq67ui.html [https://perma.cc/2997-EL2S]. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
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eign investors from developed economies whose sub-standard practices in a 
developing country have adversely affected HSCs.35 
Section A of this Part discusses the adverse impact that some foreign in-
vestments have on HSCs.36 Section B of this Part discusses desperate, often 
failed, attempts by affected HSCs to obtain a remedy within the existing dis-
pute settlement framework.37 
A. Adverse Impact of Foreign Investment-Related Activity 
It has long been recognized that investor actions can adversely affect 
HSCs, and in many jurisdictions, such affected HSCs lack effective remedial 
options.38 For example, oil producing companies have participated in gas flar-
ing activities in various locations in Nigeria for decades.39 Gas flaring is prov-
en to be harmful to inhabitants of nearby lands, violating their right to health, 
dignity, and life.40 Shell’s practices in the area have been notoriously damaging 
to the life, health, and livelihoods of the locals.41 Forestry and large scale farm-
ing land concessions and activity have led to locals being forced off traditional 
lands in Cambodia, which has obliterated their economic and cultural life 
                                                                                                                           
35 For instance, Canadian companies have been accused of undesirable practices in other jurisdic-
tions. John Ahni Schertow, Briefing on the Human Rights and Environmental Abuses of Canadian 
Corporations, IC MAG. (Dec. 28, 2009), https://intercontinentalcry.org/briefing-on-the-human-rights-
and-environmental-abuses-of-canadian-corporations/ [https://perma.cc/AZU4-X5PC]. 
36 See infra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 50–69 and accompanying text. 
38 Carola Glinski, The Ruggie Framework, Tort Law and Business Human Rights Self-Regulation: 
Increasing Standards Through Mutual Impact and Learning 2 (University of Copenhagen Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2017-41, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2997971 [https://perma.cc/9D89-HBQW]  (citing ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND 
DEV’T, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V9A-CZCY]; Comm’n on Human Rights, Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enters. with Regard to Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corps.]; Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the 
Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc E/1990/22 (1990)). See generally INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, TRIPARTITE 
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(5th ed. 2007), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/
publication/wcms_094386.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4YE-SX7S]. 
39 Eferiekose Ukala, Note, Gas Flaring in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Failed Promises and Reviving 
Community Voices, 2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 97, 103 (2011). 
40 Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria Ltd. [2005] 6 AHRLR 151, 152–54 (Nigeria). 
41 See, e.g., Emily Gosden, Why Shell’s Bodo Oil Spill Still Hasn’t Been Cleaned Up, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/01/08/yet-clean-nigerian-
oil-spills-two-years-compensation-deal/ [https://perma.cc/HK9S-WLNS]; Shell Sued in UK for “Dec-
ades of Oil Spills” in Nigeria, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2016/11/shell-sued-uk-decades-oil-spills-nigeria-161122193545741.html [https://perma.cc/8WP8-
YW9C]. 
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without due compensation.42 To make way for the construction of a shopping 
mall, perpetrators forcibly evicted over one thousand house owners amidst po-
lice brutality from a village located on the Bassac River bank in Cambodia in 
May 2006.43 Mining concessions and activities in many developing countries 
have had, and continue to have, an adverse impact on HSCs without due com-
pensation.44 Sometimes actual assault, intimidation, and, in extreme cases, 
murder occurs.45 Investment in energy generation has also resulted in wide-
                                                                                                                           
42 See, e.g., Jeff Smith, UN Presses Ministry to Protect Hill Tribes in Logging Dispute, CAMBO-
DIA DAILY (Mar. 9, 1998), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/un%E2%80%88presses-
ministry-to-protect-hill-tribes-in-logging-dispute-86426/ [https://perma.cc/G6HV-N663]; Yash Ghai 
(Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia), Report on the Im-
plementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights 
Council,” U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/36 (Jan. 30, 2007); GLOBAL WITNESS, THE COST OF LUXURY  (Feb. 
2015), https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/17788/the_cost_of_luxury_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DA7K-W7F5]; GLOBAL WITNESS, RUBBER BARONS (May 2013), https://www.globalwitness.org/
documents/10525/rubber_barons_lores_0_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJA9-5Q4J]; GLOBAL WITNESS, 
CAMBODIA’S FAMILY TREES (June 2007), https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/14689/
cambodias_family_trees_low_res.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6MZ-6TUM]; GLOBAL WITNESS, TAKING A 
CUT (Nov. 2004), https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/14709/takingacutlowres.pdf [https://
perma.cc/77NL-KX33]. 
43 See e.g., Cambodia’s Disappearing Capital: Lake Inferior—The Poor Pay for a Property 
Boom, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2009), https://www.economist.com/asia/2009/01/29/lake-inferior [https://
perma.cc/8KQR-3KGD]; Asian Human Rights Comm’n, Cambodia: The Situation of Human Rights 
in 2006 (Dec. 21, 2006), http://material.ahrchk.net/hrreport/2006/Cambodia2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6QDG-5L6Z]; U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, 
Cambodia Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Economic Land Concessions In Cambodia: 
A Human Rights Perspective (June 2007), http://cambodia.ohchr.org/~cambodiaohchr/sites/default/
files/Economic%20Land%20Concession%20-%20a%20human%20rights%20perspective%202007.
pdf [https://perma.cc/E37T-FR85]. 
44 See, e.g., Deanna Kemp & John R. Owen, The Reality of Remedy in Mining and Community 
Relations: An Anonymous Case-Study from Southeast Asia, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 239 (Mahdev Mohan & Cynthia Morel eds., 2015) [hereinafter BUSINESS AND HU-
MAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA]; Mahdev Mohan, Human Rights Risks Amidst the ‘Gold Rush’: 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 
supra, 133, 150–51; see also Roseanne Gerin, Myanmar Police Arrests Two in Letpadaung Copper 
Mine Protest, RADIO FREE ASIA (May 6, 2016)  http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-
police-arrest-two-in-letpadaung-copper-mine-protest-05062016164650.html [https://perma.cc/7BY8-
QW7E]; Wa Lone, Fresh Tension, Injuries at Letpadaung Mine, MYANMAR TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015)  
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/13144-fresh-tension-injuries-at-letpadaung-
mine.html [https://perma.cc/54U4-Z8PA]; Myanmar: Letpadaung Mine Protesters Still Denied Jus-
tice, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/11/myanmar-
letpadaung-mine-protesters-still-denied-justice/ [https://perma.cc/5HWF-X7X4]. 
45 Roseanne Gerin, As Many as 10 Myanmar Villagers Injured in Shooting at Letpadaung Copper 
Mine, RADIO FREE ASIA (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/as-many-as-10-
myanmar-villagers-injured-in-shooting-at-letpadaung-copper-mine-03242017164150.html [https://
perma.cc/CHT5-UJ8N]; Thailand: Mining Company Must Withdraw Threat of Legal Actions Against 
Community Leaders, FORUM-ASIA (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.forum-asia.org/?p=17885 [https://
perma.cc/KZX4-M9EE]; Equitable Cambodia & Inclusive Dev. Int’l, Bittersweet Harvest: A Human 
Rights Impact Assessment of the European Union’s Everything but Arms Initiative in Cambodia 
(2013), https://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Bittersweet_Harvest_
web-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR3Q-EGSJ]. 
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ranging negative social and environmental harm to thousands of HSCs.46 Some 
local workers have been subjected to what is tantamount to modern day slav-
ery practices.47 Other forms of labour rights abuses and child labour have oc-
curred in some places.48 Some companies’ activities have damaged water bod-
ies and access to clean water by locals.49 
B. Desperation of HSCs for Remedies 
As previously stated, under the current system, HSCs who are victims of 
adverse impact from investment activities are expected to seek remedies in 
their domestic fora, the very fora perceived to be inadequate for foreign inves-
                                                                                                                           
46 See, e.g., Chris Greacen & Apsara Palettu, Electricity Sector Planning and Hydropower in the 
Mekong Region, in DEMOCRATIZING WATER GOVERNANCE IN THE MEKONG REGION 93 (Louis Lebel 
et al. eds., 2007); Ian G. Baird & Noah Quastel, Rescaling and Reordering Nature-Society Relation-
ship: The Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Dam and Laos-Thailand Electricity Networks, 105 ANNALS 
ASS’N AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 1221, 1226 (2015); Ikuko Matsumoto, Laos’ Nam Theun 2 Dam 
Starts Operation, INT’L RIVERS (Mar. 23, 2010) https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/laos-
nam-theun-2-dam-starts-operation-3478 [https://perma.cc/HNT8-U9VE]; see also Brendan M. Howe 
& Seo Hyun Rachelle Park, Laos: The Dangers of Developmentalism?, 2015 S.E. ASIAN AFFAIRS 
165, 173–76 (2015); Don Sahong Dam, INT’L RIVERS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.internationalrivers.
org/campaigns/don-sahong-dam [https://perma.cc/Q974-WHHA]; Update: Nam Theun 2 Hydropower 
Project, Laos, EUROPEAN INV’T BANK (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/news/
topical_briefs/2005-november-01/nam-theun-2-hydropower-project-laos.htm [https://perma.cc/8JBT-
NQ8R]; What Is the Don Sahong Dam Project?, WWF-CAMBODIA, https://web.archive.org/web/
20170702204651/http://cambodia.panda.org/projects_and_reports/don_sahong_dam/ [https://perma.
cc/BL7U-AJ9R]. 
47 CARL MIDDLETON & ASHLEY PRITCHARD, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN ASEAN: A HU-
MAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 74 (2013) http://www.forum-asia.org/uploads/publications/2013/
September/Corporate-Accountability-ASEAN-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM7Y-7LXY]; Kate 
Hodal & Chris Kelly, Trafficked into Slavery on Thai Trawlers to Catch Food for Prawns, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jun/10/-sp-
migrant-workers-new-life-enslaved-thai-fishing [https://perma.cc/JB8D-PZYZ]; Margie Mason et al., 
Shrimp Sold by Global Supermarkets Is Peeled by Slave Labourers in Thailand, THE GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/14/shrimp-sold-by-
global-supermarkets-is-peeled-by-slave-labourers-in-thailand [https://perma.cc/JJ24-TMP3]; Becky 
Palmstrom, Forced to Fish: Slavery on Thailand’s Trawlers, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/magazine-25814718 [https://perma.cc/V46D-D8TD]; Indonesia: Burmese Workers in 
Slave-Like Conditions to Catch Seafood Supplying US Businesses, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., 
https://business-humanrights.org/en/indonesia-burmese-workers-in-slave-like-conditions-to-catch-
seafood-supplying-us-businesses [https://perma.cc/H5PT-7UFV]; Letter from 45 Regional and Inter-
national Nongovernmental Organizations and Labor Associations to Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, Prime 
Minister of Thailand (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Letter%
20to%20Thai%20PM%20regarding%20prison%20labor_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9RE-NTPL]. 
48 IRENE PIETROPAOLI & BOBBIE ST. MARIA, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, 
BRIEFING: DEVELOPMENT FOR ALL, OR A PRIVILEGED FEW? 16–17, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Business/AsiaForum/Southeast_Asia_Briefing_16April_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4HS-
7G7Y]; Surya P. Subedi (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia), A Hu-
man Rights Analysis of Economic and Other Land Concessions in Cambodia, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/
63/Add.1/Rev.1, at 54–55 (Oct. 11, 2012). 
49 Subedi, supra note 48, at 54–55. 
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tors. Unsurprisingly, those fora turn out to be woefully unhelpful to victims in 
many developing countries. In many of the incidences mentioned above, the 
affected HSCs did not have an avenue for effective remedy. Incidences in 
Cambodia and Nigeria offer specific examples. 
In August 2006, the Cambodian government granted land concessions 
covering vast tracts of land to two companies in a province called Koh Kong. 
The two companies, Koh Kong Sugar Industry Co. Ltd. (“KKS”) and Koh 
Kong Plantation Co. Ltd. (“KKP”), were owned 70% by a Thai company, 
Khon Kaen Sugar Industry Group, and 30% by a Taiwanese company, Ve 
Wong Corporation.50 The concessions involved forced evictions of HSCs from 
their traditional lands.51  
In February 2007, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) representing the af-
fected HSCs filed a complaint against KKS and KKP in Cambodia’s Koh 
Kong Provincial Court seeking cancellation of the concession granted to KKS 
and KKP. 52 They argued that the transfer of the land was illegal because the 
concession (1) contravened Cambodian law against the arbitrary expropriation 
of private property; (2) breached the right of the affected HSCs to fair and just 
compensation for acquisition of their registered land; (3) contravened Cambo-
dian law prohibiting the grant of concessions of state-private land of more than 
ten thousand hectares to the same person or company (the concession covered 
two lots spanning ten thousand hectares land); and (4) contravened the re-
quirement that environmental and social impact assessments must be carried 
out, that public consultations be held with potentially affected communities, 
and that solutions for voluntary resettlement be reached before economic land 
concessions are granted. 
In March 2007, a group of the affected HSCs travelled to Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia’s capital, to submit complaints to the country’s National Assembly, 
the Ministry of the Interior, the Council of Ministers, and other government 
bodies. The discussions with various government bodies that continued over 
the following two years did not resolve the issues.  
In September 2012, more than five years after the affected HSCs peti-
tioned the Koh Kong Provincial Court, the court ruled that it did not have the 
                                                                                                                           
50 See Kuch Naren, Thai Representative Meets with Koh Kong ‘Blood Sugar’ Families, CAMBO-
DIA DAILY (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archive/thai-representative-meets-with-
koh-kong-blood-sugar-families-11884 [https://perma.cc/BJ9C-ZNBV]. A Cambodian businessman 
and Senator, Ly Yong Phat, originally owned 20% of the plantations but reportedly sold his stake to 
Kong Kaen in 2010. 
51 For further facts and commentary on the case, see Mahdev Mohan, The Road to Song Mao: 
Transnational Litigation from Southeast Asia to the United Kingdom, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 
e-30, e-30 (2014), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CFDC
97535628A0145944F1AE74526D01/S2398772300009661a.pdf/road_to_song_mao_transnational_
litigation_from_southeast_asia_to_the_united_kingdom.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGC9-VADE]. 
52 Id. 
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power to hear the dispute.53 The court transferred the case to a Cambodian al-
ternative dispute resolution body, the Cadastral Survey Commission, to take 
action.54 It is unclear whether the commission took any action. 
The unsuccessful attempts by the affected HSCs to obtain redress in the 
Cambodian court system epitomises the problems some HSCs face in seeking 
remedies in their domestic system. Efforts at the domestic level by wronged 
HSCs in other jurisdictions have been similarly ineffective. Even in the rare 
case where a domestic court in Nigeria granted a declaration against gas flar-
ing in favour of affected HSCs, as well as a restraint on the government of Ni-
geria and Shell Petroleum,55 gas flaring continued.56  
Some desperate HSCs who are unable to obtain remedies at home have 
resorted to unorthodox methods. Some have initiated suits in the investors’ 
home state or other locations where the investor conducts substantial opera-
tions. An example is the ultimately unsuccessful U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., decided in 2013,57 in which a group of 
Nigerians sued Shell in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute for al-
leged torts committed by Shell in Nigeria. An earlier example is Bowoto v. 
Chevron Corp., decided in 2010 by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in which claims by a group of desperate Nigerians failed.58 Fur-
thermore, in Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Co., on the night before 
the trial commenced at the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in 2009, Shell agreed to settle after thirteen years of litigation.59  
                                                                                                                           
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Gbemre, 6 AHRLR at 155–56. 
56 Shell Still Flaring Gas, Defying Nigerian Courts, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH EUROPE (May 3, 
2007), http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2007/May3_DU_Flaring.htm [https://perma.cc/Y6VW-
CEYS]; Gas Flares Still a Burning Issue in the Niger Delta, IRIN (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.
irinnews.org/report/95034/nigeria-gas-flares-still-burning-issue-niger-delta [https://perma.cc/H78Q-
RWRR] (“While gas flaring has technically been illegal in Nigeria since 1984, the government some-
times grants exemptions to oil companies.”). 
57 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 113–14 (2013). 
58 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F. 3d 1116, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2010). 
59 Ed Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m Over Saro-Wiwa Killing, THE GUARDIAN (June 8, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria-usa [https://perma.cc/QEE3-H6AL]; Press 
Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Settlement Reached in Human Rights Case Against Royal 
Dutch/Shell (June 8, 2009), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/settlement-reached-
human-rights-cases-against-royal-dutchshell [https://perma.cc/92SE-5JV2]. In January 2013, four out 
of five claims against Shell arising out of spills in Nigeria were quashed by a Dutch court. Fiona Har-
vey & Afua Hirsch, Shell Acquitted of Nigeria Pollution Charges, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/30/shell-acquitted-nigeria-pollution-charges 
[https://perma.cc/3NBF-X6LD]. The matter has been so protracted that the UNEP compiled a report on 
the issue. See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland (2011), https://
postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CVX-GUH3]. 
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In the Cambodian example mentioned above, while the HSCs’ petition to 
the Koh Kong Provincial Court stalled, the claimants sought recourse beyond 
Cambodia.60 In January 2010, they filed a complaint in Thailand, the home 
state of the majority owner, KSL.61 They filed the complaint before the Na-
tional Human Rights Commission of Thailand (“Thai Commission”) alleging 
that KSL, through its subsidiaries in Cambodia, had obtained the land conces-
sion illegally.62 The Thai Commission accepted jurisdiction and investigated 
the claim.63 It found evidence of breaches of human rights principles and in-
struments.64 However, the Thai Commission did not have the power to bind 
the company. 
In 2013, the HSCs commenced proceedings in the United Kingdom’s 
High Court against Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd., a UK-based company to which 
KKS and KKP sold the produce from the disputed land.65 The claim was based 
on the tort of conversion, a tortious protection against wrongful interferences 
with goods.66 The HSC claimants argued that, as purchasers of the produce 
from the sugarcane grown on the land from which they were violently and un-
lawfully expelled, the defendants wrongfully deprived them of their property.67  
In 2014, in Bodo Community v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Ni-
geria, more than 15,000 HSCs sought compensation under the law of Nigeria 
in relation to oil spills from pipelines said to have been caused by Shell in the 
Niger Delta.68 When the claimants sued in the United Kingdom, Shell settled the 
case for $55 million Euros without admitting liability. 
Litigation has been initiated in the Netherlands too. In Dooh et al. v. Roy-
al Dutch Shell, Nigerians sued Shell in the Netherlands for the harm its opera-
                                                                                                                           
60 Mohan, supra note 51, at e-30. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at e-30 n.2 (citing Particulars of Claim, Song Mao v. Tate & Lyle Indus. Ltd., Claim No. 
2013 Folio 451 [2013] EWHC (Comm.) [2013] QB (Eng.), https://www.business-humanrights.org/
sites/default/files/media/documents/tate-lyle-particular-of-claim-28-mar-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J48G-CE8K]). 
66 Conversion has been the primary vehicle for tortious protection against interferences with 
goods. See generally ROBIN HICKEY, PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF FINDERS (2010). 
67 See Mohan, supra note 51, at e-30 n.2 (citing Particulars of Claim, Song Mao, [2013] EWHC 
(Comm.)). The status of the case is unclear. There does not seem to have been a valid judgement 
handed down by the court, five years after it was filed. It was listed for hearing, but the hearing did 
not happen. See Did the Cambodian Sugar Case Settle? CORP. WAR CRIMES (May 1, 2015), https://
corporatewarcrimes.com/2015/05/01/did-the-cambodian-sugar-case-settle/ [https://perma.cc/F63P-
PNT6]. 
68 Glinski, supra note 38, at 10 (citing Bodo v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria [2014] 
EWHC (TCC) 1973, [2014] QB (Eng.)). 
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tion in the Niger Delta area caused them.69 It can be seen from the above discus-
sions that investment-related activities sometimes harm HSCs. In response, 
HSCs have pursued remedies, but their pursuit has been difficult. I now turn to 
efforts at resolving this difficulty. 
III. EFFORTS SO FAR AT SOLVING THE PROBLEMS 
This Part looks briefly at the United Nation’s main efforts to address the 
problems identified in Part II. I conclude that those efforts have been ineffec-
tive; there remains a serious lack of access to effective remedies for HSCs in 
many developing countries.  
For decades, the UN has made efforts to aid HSCs. There was a UN re-
port in 1973 looking into the conduct of multinational corporations in develop-
ing countries.70 In 1983, the UN drafted a code of conduct on transnational 
corporations, which, among other things, called on corporations to respect and 
observe domestic laws, regulations and administrative practices.71 Article 9 of 
the code called on transnational corporations to adhere to the economic goals 
and development objectives, policies, and priorities of the host states, while 
Article 12 called on them to adhere to socio-cultural objectives and values.72 
                                                                                                                           
69 Cees van Dam, Preliminary Judgments Dutch Court of Appeal in the Shell Nigeria Case, ¶ 1 
(Jan. 14, 2016),  http://www.ceesvandam.info/default.asp?fileid=643 [https://perma.cc/YJ8F-L6MH]. 
70 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Development 
Process and on International Relations, U.N. Doc E/5500 (June 14, 1974). See generally Christopher 
May, Multinational Corporations in World Development: 40 Years On, 38 THIRD WORLD Q. 2223 
(2017) (reviewing the first major discussion at the UN on the role of multinational corporations in 
world development in 1973, and attempts at progressing the discussions over the following forty 
years). 
71 See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations, ¶¶ 6–8, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.1, annex II, 23 I.L.M. 626 (1984). 
72 Id. arts. 9, 12. Articles 9 provides: 
Transnational corporations shall/should carry on their activities in conformity with the 
development policies, objectives and priorities set out by the Governments of the coun-
tries in which they operate and work seriously towards making a positive contribution 
to the achievement of such goals at the national and, as appropriate, the regional level, 
within the framework of regional integration programmes. Transnational corporations 
shall/should co-operate with the Governments of the countries in which they operate 
with a view to contributing to the development process and shall/should be responsive 
to requests for consultation in this respect, thereby establishing mutually beneficial rela-
tions with these countries. 
Id. art. 9. Article 12 provides: 
Transnational corporations should/shall respect the social and cultural objectives, values 
and traditions of the countries in which they operate. While economic and technological 
development is normally accompanied by social change, transnational corporations 
should/shall avoid practices, products or services which cause detrimental effects on 
cultural patterns and socio-cultural objectives as determined by Governments. For this 
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Most significantly, Article 13 called on transnational corporations to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.73 But, the document remained a draft 
and does not have the force of law. In 1990, a UN intergovernmental working 
group drafted a code of conduct for transnational corporations.74 Consequently, 
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights was adopted in 2003.75 
The UN’s Global Compact also offers guidance to businesses in implementing 
socially responsible policies.76 The most acclaimed of the recent efforts is John 
                                                                                                                           
purpose, transnational corporations should/shall respond positively to requests for con-
sultations from Governments concerned. 
Id. art. 12. 
73 Id. art. 13. Article 13 provides as follows: 
Transnational corporations should/shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the countries in which they operate. In their social and industrial relations, transna-
tional corporations should/shall not discriminate on the basis of race, colour, sex, reli-
gion, language, social, national and ethnic origin or political or other opinion. Transna-
tional corporations should/shall conform to government policies designed to extend 
equality of opportunity and treatment. 
Id. 
74 Glinski, supra note 38, at 2 (citing Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Forty-Sixth Ses-
sion, supra note 38). 
75 Id. (citing Comm’n on Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corps., 
supra note 38). 
76 The United Nations Global Compact (“UNGC”) is a UN initiative to encourage businesses 
worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on their implementa-
tion. Its mission is to support companies to (1) do business responsibly by aligning their strategies and 
operations with UNGC’s Ten Principles on human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption; 
and (2) take strategic actions to advance broader societal goals, such as sustainable development, with 
an emphasis on collaboration and innovation. UNGC’s ten principles (grouped under the four themes 
of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption) are as follows: 
Human Rights 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally pro-
claimed human rights; and 
Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
Labour 
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recogni-
tion of the right to collective bargaining; 
Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and 
Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
Environment 
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental chal-
lenges; 
Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and 
Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technol-
ogies. 
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Ruggie’s, “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework,” which led to the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011.77 The attempts so 
far “have either failed,” “remained soft law” or relied on “the voluntary co-
operation of transnational corporations.”78 Currently, transnationally active 
corporations are not bound by public international law obligations.79 Obliga-
tions, if any, are seen mainly in terms of the domestic law of the host state, and 
not as an overarching international standard. Ruggie has thus surmised that the 
challenge is to change the fact that “[e]ach legally distinct entity is subject to the 
laws of the countries in which it operates, but the corporate group as a whole is 
not governed directly by international law.”80 
While the focus of this Essay is for a where harmed HSCs may access ef-
fective remedies, rather than the substantive law on, or source of, obligations 
of foreign investors, I will briefly comment on the supposed challenge of sub-
jecting multinational investors to international law. The idea that the obliga-
tions of investors are determined by the host state where the investors are op-
erating is rooted in the notions of state sovereignty,81 non-interference,82 and 
                                                                                                                           
Anti-Corruption 
Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion 
and bribery. 
U.N. GLOB. COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles [https://perma.
cc/2ANR-SZ67]. 
77 Glinski, supra note 38, at 4; see also U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
78 Glinski, supra note 38, at 4. 
79 Id. at 2 (citing Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self-Governance Through Global Product Certifi-
cation Programmes, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW IN TRANSNATION-
AL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 259 (Olaf Dilling et al. eds., 2008)). 
80 Id. (quoting John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agen-
da, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 824 (2007)). 
81 Jibin Mary George, Doctrine of Sovereignty, ACADEMIKE (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.
lawctopus.com/academike/doctrine-of-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/KH5Y-SJC] (“In the simplest 
terms, the doctrine of sovereignty refers to the quality of enjoying a superseding authority over a geo-
graphical area or a populace.”). Sovereignty, in the relation between states, signifies independence. 
Independence with regard to a territory (i.e., a portion of the globe) is a state’s right to exercise there-
in, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of that state. See Island of Palmas Case (Nether-
lands v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
82 The principle of non-interference is the corollary doctrine of sovereignty. Essentially, sover-
eign states shall not intervene in each other’s internal affairs. It is based on the respect for states’ sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity, which governs the relationship between states with regard to their 
rights and obligations. It is seen as a general principle of customary international law, but it is also 
enshrined in the UN Charter (Article 25). For discussions of the principle, see generally Zhang 
Naigen, The Principle of Non-interference and Its Application in Practices of Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 9 FUDAN J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 449 (2016). 
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territoriality.83 That is, domestic laws in a country are determined by that sov-
ereign state, and it is those domestic laws that determine what obligations are 
owed by individuals and entities within the jurisdiction. In other words, it is 
solely domestic law that determines legality and compensation schemes. Other 
countries cannot make laws for the internal operations of another country. 
Where there are weak or non-existent laws to protect citizens or the environ-
ment, investors can take advantage of the situation and operate “legally” with-
in the laws of the host state, while blatantly harming citizens or the environ-
ment generally. Where the laws are there, they are probably there because they 
are copied from another jurisdiction (i.e., legal transplant), but are poorly un-
derstood or enforced, and investors can still take advantage of them. 
When sovereignty and territoriality did not suit advanced countries, those 
countries formulated and imposed an international minimum standard of 
treatment for countries, specifically developing countries. Developing coun-
tries in Latin America in the mid-nineteenth century and later in Asia and Afri-
ca in the mid-twentieth century, tried to use notions of sovereignty and equality 
to subject foreign investors to their local laws.84 Their argument, which has 
become known as the Calvo doctrine (named after its chief proponent, Car-
los Calvo) is to the effect that:  
[I]f the host State treated foreign investors without discrimination, 
and on a par with nationals of the country, then that host State was 
in compliance with the norms of international law . . . . Essentially, 
the Calvo doctrine views the principle of sovereignty of States to en-
tail: (a) absolute equality before the law between nationals and for-
eigners; (b) exclusive subjection of foreigners and their property to 
                                                                                                                           
83 “Title to territory is based on Sovereignty.” DONALD R. ROTHWELL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS WITH AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES 333 (2014). The territoriality principle 
is a principle of public international law that bars states from exercising jurisdiction beyond their borders, 
unless they have jurisdiction under other principles. See, e.g., CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–8 (2015); see also Anna Stilz, Why Do States Have Territorial 
Rights?, 1 INT’L THEORY 185, 186 (quoting A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF 
RIGHTS 306 (1992) to explain that state rights over territory include “(a) rights to exercise juris-
diction (either full or partial) over those within the territory, and so to control and coerce in substantial 
ways even non-citizens within it; (b) rights to reasonably full control over land and resources within the 
territory that are not privately owned; (c) rights to tax and regulate uses of that which is privately owned 
within the state’s claimed territory; (d) rights to control or prohibit movement across the borders of the 
territory; and (e) rights to limit or prohibit ‘‘dismemberment’’ of the state’s territories”). 
84 Laryea, supra note 19, at 294–95 (citing NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 465–66 (2009); DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF 
INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 17–19 (1955); Alwyn V. Freeman, 
Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge to International Law, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 
121 (1946); K. Lipstein, The Place of the Calvo Clause in International Law, 22 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 130 
(1945); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20–24 (2005)). 
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the laws and jurisdictions of the country in which they reside or in-
vest; and (c) abstention from intervention by other governments, 
particularly those of countries whose nationals are investing or re-
siding abroad and who may be in dispute with the nationals or 
governments of the host country.85 
The Calvo doctrine was rejected by developed countries, who claimed a 
State was instead bound by standard international law rules, which entail an 
international minimum standard of treatment.86 Developed countries rejected 
the supremacy of the laws of sovereign states within their jurisdictions, and 
superimposed an overarching international standard because they feared that 
the Calvo doctrine rendered investments of their citizens vulnerable in devel-
oping countries. And that fear was not unfounded. For example, there were 
nationalizations in Africa and Asia without appropriate compensation.87 So, it 
is understandable that developed countries advocated for an international 
standard. 
But, the duplicity of developed countries is betrayed when they say 
the obligations of investors is a matter for the host state. They say so for two 
reasons. First, they are likely to be capital exporters to developing countries, 
and therefore, ultimate beneficiaries of the lapses in developing countries that 
are taken advantage of by their investors.88 Second, their domestic laws and 
institutions are strong and so they will not suffer the effect of the lack of laws 
that impose minimum standards on investors. They see no advantage or need 
for international standards on investors’ behavior that would only benefit de-
veloping countries, and arguably reduce the profits of their corporations. For 
instance, as previously stated above, BP’s spillage in the Gulf of Mexico re-
sulted in $61 billion in penalties, compensation, and clean-up costs89 because 
                                                                                                                           
85 Id. (citing SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND 
PRINCIPLE 14 (2008); Wil D. Verwey & Nico J. Schrijver, The Taking of Foreign Property Under Inter-
national Law: A New Legal Perspective?, 15 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT’L L. 3, 23 (1984)). 
86 Id. at 295 (citing SUBEDI, supra note 85, at 15; Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Re-
siding Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 528 (1910)). 
87 An African example is Libya’s nationalization of foreign interests in petroleum conces-
sions within the country, an action that generated a few notable cases. See, e.g., British Petroleum 
Co. v. Libya, Award (Oct. 10, 1973), 53 I.L.R. 297 (1974); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. 
Libya, Award, 104 J. Droit Int’l 350 (1977), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978); Libya Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 20 
I.L.M. 1 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.1977). Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company is noted to be the first 
case in the history of international arbitration relating to development contracts where an arbitral 
tribunal held that the injured parties were entitled to restitution in integrum, and that the sover-
eign State was obliged to perform specifically its contractual obligations with private foreign 
investors. Laryea, supra note 19, at 295. 
88 With the exception of a few developing countries, such as China (if we can still call it a devel-
oping country), most developing countries are net importers of capital. 
89 See Mufson, supra note 32.  
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there are strong laws and enforcement mechanisms in the United States. The 
same cannot be said of Shell’s spills and devastating pollution in Nigeria. 
I am not against minimum international law standards that must be upheld 
by States to give protection to investors and their investments abroad. Actions 
of some developing HSGs towards foreign investors are clearly abusive of in-
vestors’ rights.90 But, I am in favor of balanced protections: protections for the 
investor, and protections against the investor’s wrongs. If developed countries 
endorsed such efforts, international standards could be set for both. As it 
stands, they have taken the low road by seeking protection for investors against 
the weak laws and institutions in developing countries, but not against the 
harm inflicted by investors.  
There is a glimpse of hope for an international legally binding instrument 
on the conduct of transnational corporations eventuating from the work of the 
UN’s Human Rights Council, which is considering such an option.91 But, as 
noted above, this is not the first time such options have been considered. There 
                                                                                                                           
90 In Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre & Government of Gha-
na, 95 I.L.R. 184 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1990), for instance, the Claimants (Antoine Biloune and Marine 
Drive Complex Ltd. (a Ghanaian corporation in which Biloune was the principal shareholder) entered 
into a joint venture agreement with the Ghana Tourist Development Company (“GTDC”), a govern-
ment agency. The venture was for the construction and management of a new four-star hotel resort 
complex. GTDC contributed the land, for a share of 51% stake in the venture, and MDCL was to 
finance and manage the construction and operation of the hotel, for a share of 49% in the venture. Id. 
MDCL applied to the Ghana Investment Centre (“GIC”), another state agency, and was given approv-
al for the investment. Id. About a year into the construction, the local government in the area where 
the land was located, the Accra City Council, served notice on the parties to the venture to stop work, 
and to “show cause” why the construction should not be demolished. Id. Before the expiration of the 
notice period given to show cause, the construction was demolished. Biloune and other officers of 
MDCL were asked to report to the National Investigations Committee (“NIC”). Id. NIC asked Biloune 
to declare his assets, giving him a form to complete for that purpose. Subsequently, NIC referred Bi-
loune to the Office of Revenue Commission. After Biloune and his accountants requested and ob-
tained several extensions on the deadline to file his declaration form, he was arrested and held in cus-
tody for thirteen days without charge. Id. He was then deported from the country, on the grounds that 
his presence in Ghana was “not conductive to the public good,” and he was warned never to return to 
the country. Id. The tribunal found that “the conjunction of the stop work order, the demolition, the 
summons, the arrest, the detention, the requirement of filing assets declaration forms, and the deporta-
tion of Biloune without possibility of re-entry” had the effect of constructively expropriating MDCL’s 
assets, and Biloune's investment. Id. Even if Biloune infringed any laws of Ghana (and, Ghana ad-
duced very little evidence to that effect), the Ghanaian authorities seem to have abused their authority 
in their treatment of him. Id. 
91 For the text of the draft of the legally binding instrument, see U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Draft Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises (July 16, 2018), https://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y28W-LDNX]. 
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have been several attempts in the past, and they have all failed because of the 
lack of support from developed countries.92 
Treaties are one of many sources of international legal obligations. Arti-
cle 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”), 
which is generally considered to be the most authoritative enumeration of the 
sources of international law, identifies sources of international law other than 
treaties. These include “general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions.”93 International tribunals have applied general principles of law in decid-
ing cases. For instance, in Amco Asia Corporation v. Indonesia, decided in 
1984, the ICSID tribunal “looked to general principles of law rather than to the 
treaty’s terms for guidance” in calculating damages to be paid by Indonesia.94 
The tribunal referred to and applied the general principles governing damages 
for contractual liability under Indonesian law, French law, English law and 
U.S. law, which it found to be similar.95 Similarly, it is arguable that general 
principles of the tort of negligence (duty on investors, or their activities, not to 
cause harm) can be deduced for application.96 Even if general international 
principles of tort cannot be readily deduced, arbitral tribunals may apply the 
tort law of the state where the harm was caused, which is likely to be the law 
of the host state.97  As currently formulated, the ICJ Statute only binds con-
senting states.98 Accordingly, international law generally only binds states.  
But, this supposed barrier is, itself, part of the convenience and duplicity 
previously alluded to in this Essay. A state may subject its nationals, including 
corporations, to general principles of law. Tribunals may apply general princi-
ples of law to determine whether an investor has committed a wrong in a given 
                                                                                                                           
92 For a detailed discussion of these efforts, see Karl P. Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United 
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 11, 53–54 
(2015). 
93 Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in International Humanitarian Law, 34 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 347, 362 n.68 (1998) (quoting Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 
38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945)). 
94 Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award (Nov. 21, 1984), 24 I.L.M. 
1022 (1985); KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: TEXTS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 51 (2013). 
95 Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 1036–37. 
96 See, e.g., Glinski, supra note 38, at 6–7 (arguing that the basis of tort law on negligence are sim-
ilar in English, German, and U.S. laws). 
97 This is the position taken by the European Union. See Council Regulation 864/2007, art. 4(1), 
2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007
R0864&from=EN [https://perma.cc/YSQ7-FCP7]. While this is EU specific, it may hold lessons for 
the IRDS proposed in this Essay. 
98 The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. All UN member states are parties 
to the Statute of the ICJ. See U.N. Charter arts. 92–93.  “Only states may be parties in cases before the 
Court [ICJ]” and the “[t]he Court [ICJ] shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute.”  Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 34(1), 35(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945). 
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situation. Subjecting transnational corporations to international law may entail 
complex conceptual and doctrinal issues and arguments that are beyond the 
scope of this Essay. If developed economies wish to have that happen, though, 
it will likely happen, as is evidenced by the responsibility of states towards 
transnational corporations. 
 As previously stated, the focus of this Essay is determining a fo-
rum where harmed HSCs can access effective remedies. In many cases, 
such as those discussed in Part II.B above, the problem lies with the avail-
ability, quality, competence or effectiveness of the domestic forum, rather than 
with the substantive law of obligations. These deficiencies are what investors 
try to avoid when they argue for international arbitration. International arbitra-
tion between the HSCs and foreign investors will ameliorate that problem for 
HSCs. That is the focus of this Essay, to which I now turn. 
IV. IRDS AS A SOLUTION 
I propose making the current investment arbitration system (or an interna-
tional investment court system that may eventuate) available to HSCs who are 
harmed by a foreign investor. Unlike the current ISA system, the IRDS system 
would give HSCs a forum to initiate arbitral proceedings against international 
investors. The IRDS would help solve the problem of the lack of access to 
remedies for HSCs. 
Allowing HSCs to be able to seek remedies through international arbitra-
tion has numerous benefits. First, it will ameliorate, if not eliminate, their ac-
cess to remedies problem.99 Second, allowing HSCs to initiate arbitral pro-
ceedings will be just, fair, and equitable to both investors and HSCs. Third, the 
system will help balance the rights of investors and those of HSCs (currently, 
the system is lopsided in favor of investors). Fourth, it may mean that some 
investors will no longer be able to get away with sub-standard, damaging or 
harmful practices.100 Fifth, where an investor does not have “sufficient assets 
. . . within a territory,” an arbitral award would be better able to be “enforceable 
abroad, where more valuable assets may be located, than” a domestic court 
judgement.101 Sixth, it may help reduce negative perceptions about, and back-
lash against, ISAs.102 Seventh, such an avenue for remedies for possible harm 
                                                                                                                           
99 See supra notes 70–80 and accompanying text (discussing HSCs’ access to remedies). 
100 See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text (providing examples of past damaging and 
harmful investor practices). 
101 THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, supra 
note 1, at 590. 
102 See id. at xxvii–xlv (outlining negative perceptions about ISAs, discussing the negative per-
ceptions and backlash, and attempting to dispel some of those perceptions). 
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may help reduce social conflict surrounding some investments, and conse-
quently, reduce delays and costs as well. 
The IRDS proposed here is to be seen as an alternate forum to litigation in 
domestic courts against an investor for harm caused by the investor. Instead of 
going to a weak or ineffective domestic court, an HSC can go to arbitration. 
That means the complainant may be an individual or a group, possibly in a 
class action. 
I anticipate economic, legal and systemic objections to this proposal. 
Therefore, Section A of this Part addresses the potential economic objections 
to establishing an IRDS system.103 Then, Section B of this Part addresses the 
potential legal and systemic objections to establishing an IRDS system.104 
A. Economic Objections 
Possible economic objections are that such a system would (1) increase 
the risk of cases against investors and therefore, dissuade them from investing 
in developing countries; (2) lead to an increased cost of doing business in de-
veloping countries, making them uncompetitive and undermining their ability 
to attract investment; (3) waste investors’ time and delay projects if multiple, 
particularly vexatious, proceedings are initiated; and (4) cost HSCs more in 
arbitration fees than they may be able to afford. 
Apart from the objection that HSCs may not be able to afford the cost of 
arbitration, all the objections equally apply to litigation in domestic courts, 
which is already available to HSCs in the current system. HSCs who perceive 
that an investment activity will cause harm, or has caused harm, to their heath, 
property, or environment can initiate court action to obtain injunctive or other 
remedial relief against the investor. Several of these have been cited in Part III 
above.105 Therefore, affording HSCs a better forum, as proposed in this Essay, 
should not increase the incidence of cases or the cost of doing business. It 
should not lead to delay of projects. If anything, the current system breeds dis-
content and social conflicts, which IRDS could ameliorate. Only investors who 
intend to operate by unacceptable standards, taking advantage of the lax sys-
tems in some developing countries, would have reason to fear that the access 
to effective international fora for remedies would thwart their intentions. 
Arbitration costs could be substantial, and unaffordable by certain HSCs. 
Litigation can be costly too, though. Even if international arbitration is costlier, 
that should not be a reason for blocking access to the arbitration process to 
HSCs. Given the opportunity, impecunious HSCs who have been harmed by 
                                                                                                                           
103 See infra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
104 See infra notes 108–120 and accompanying text. 
105 See supra notes 70–80 and accompanying text. 
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investment activities may receive the help of benevolent organizations to take 
up their cause. Many of the cases referred to in Part III above were initiated 
with the support of benevolent organizations.106 Further, considering that for-
eign investors are likely to have deep pockets, strong cases against them may 
be attractive to third-party funders, who may fund cases with the expectation 
of commercial benefit, or law firms pre-financing the case on the basis that 
their legal fees are contingent on being successful. Third-party funders and law 
firm pre-financing may help HSCs initiate claims in circumstances where the 
HSCs are unable to afford the costs of arbitration. 
In summary, the proposed IRDS system, if implemented, would improve 
the current position of many HSCs and make investment arbitration, the domi-
nant mechanism for settling investment disputes, work for all parties—
investors and non-investors. 
B. Legal or Systemic Objections 
Two main legal or systemic objections may be raised. The first relates to 
the legal basis for claims. That is, by what law, international law or domestic 
law, would an investor’s legal liability, or non-liability, be determined? The 
second objection relates to investors’ consent to arbitrate. That is, as arbitration 
is a consensual dispute resolution mechanism, meaning no tribunal will have 
jurisdiction unless all parties to the dispute have consented to the tribunal’s ju-
risdiction to determine the matter, how may an investor’s consent be obtained? 
I have previously discussed issues of substantive law in Part III above.107 I 
do not intend to go over those again. I will, therefore, address only the issue of 
consent to arbitrate in this section. There are various ways by which the consent 
                                                                                                                           
106 See, e.g., Mohan, supra note 51, at 32–35 (explaining a Cambodian case, Song Mao, involving 
the evictions for the sugar cane plantation where several CSOs, including Equitable Cambodia, Cam-
bodian Human Rights and Development Association (“ADHOC”), Cambodian League of the Promo-
tion and Defense of Human Rights (“LICADHO”), Citizens Commission on Human Rights 
(“CCHR”), and Community Legal Education Center (“CLEC”), worked in concert with the affected 
HSCs to document the abuses related to the land, and in seeking redress in the various fora). Dooh et 
al. v. Royal Dutch Shell, discussed above, was commenced in the District Court (Rechtbank) in The 
Hague by Friends of the Earth Netherlands on behalf of four representatives of HSCs in the Niger 
Delta area of Nigeria that were adversely affected by Shell’s operations in the area. See Dam, supra 
note 69, ¶ 1; see also Jon Vidal, Niger Delta Villagers Go to the Hague to Fight Against Oil Giant 
Shell, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/06/shell-oil-
spills-niger-delta-pollution [https://perma.cc/H7QF-344W]. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, dis-
cussed above, was initiated by the Centre for Constitutional Rights (A U.S.-based organization that is 
dedicated to advancing and protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) on behalf of the HSCs. See Press Release, Center for Consti-
tutional Rights, Settlement Reached in Human Rights Case Against Royal Dutch/Shell (June 8, 2009), 
https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/settlement-reached-human-rights-cases-against-
royal-dutchshell [https://perma.cc/92SE-5JV2]; Pilkington, supra note 59. 
107 See supra notes 70–98 and accompanying text. 
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of all parties, HSCs and investors, may be obtained. In the context of this Essay, 
HSCs are those who would be seeking arbitration. That is, they are the ones that 
will have the opportunity to initiate arbitration proceedings. It is fair to say that 
if an HSC initiates a proceeding as a claimant, that HSC would, by necessity, 
consent to the tribunal arbitrating the matter in dispute. If so, the consent of 
HSCs is a non-issue. The issue is the consent of the respondent investor. 
There are several ways by which an investor’s consent to arbitrate may be 
obtained. These include: (1) ad hoc, case by case, consent (i.e., giving consent 
when requested by an HSC after a dispute has arisen); (2) voluntarily making a 
standing offer of consent to all HSCs, which may be accepted by the act of ini-
tiating arbitral proceedings; (3) making a standing offer of consent to all HSCs 
in an investment contract between the investor and the host state, if there was 
such a contract; (4) a declaration in the host state’s law that all foreign investors 
are deemed to have consented to arbitration initiated by HSCs; and (5) a decla-
ration in a mandatory domestic licensing or authorization regime for foreign 
investors and investments stating that they have consented to arbitration pro-
ceedings initiated by HSCs. Some of these mechanisms are more practical, or 
would be more effective, than others. I look at each in turn. 
1. Ad Hoc Consent 
An investor would feasibly consent to a request by HSCs to arbitrate when 
a dispute has arisen. Such an option will not be of much help to HSCs, however. 
An investor who has caused harm, and thinks an award is likely to be made 
against it, is unlikely to consent to arbitration. This would be particularly un-
likely if the investor believes that litigation in domestic courts of the host state 
would be to its advantage. An investor in such a situation is likely to decline 
consent, and to steer the harmed HSCs to the domestic courts, which, as previ-
ously stated, can turn out to be unhelpful in some jurisdictions.108 
2. Standing Offer of Consent to All HSCs 
An investor may make a standing offer of consent by publishing a decla-
ration to HSCs who may wish to institute arbitral proceedings against it. This 
process is reminiscent of some governments’ undertaking in domestic law that 
they consent to arbitration with foreign investors.109 Such provisions are found 
                                                                                                                           
108See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
109 See, e.g., Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act (2013), Act 865 (Ghana), http://www.
gipcghana.com/press-and-media/downloads/promotional-materials/3-gipc-act-2013-act-865/file.html 
[https://perma.cc/5J5S-7FQK]. The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act states: 
(1) Where a dispute arises between a foreign investor and the Government in respect of 
an enterprise, effort shall be made through mutual discussion to reach an amicable set-
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in investment promotion legislation or policy documents, and the offer of arbi-
tration is independent of arbitration clauses in IIAs to which the government 
may be a party. 
The advantage of the standing offer option is that it would have been 
made before a dispute arises between the HSCs and the investor. HSCs seeking 
to commence arbitral proceedings would not be at the mercy of the prospective 
respondent investor. And, HSCs would be able to initiate proceedings quicker, 
as they do not need to wait for the consent of the investor, which they may or 
may not get. 
The big question, though, is whether prospective investors will make such 
standing offers to HSCs voluntarily. Why will an investor make such an offer, 
and thereby open itself up to arbitral proceedings, when it can limit any claims 
to domestic fora? One can envisage that, at best, investors of high repute, who 
are confident of operating impeccably or open to remedying their shortcom-
ings are the ones who will make such an offer. Investors willing to take ad-
vantage of the weak system of laws and judiciaries are unlikely to be support-
ive of such a scheme. 
Thus, a system providing a voluntary standing offer of consent is unlikely 
to be helpful to those HSCs who need it most. At best, there will be some in-
vestors willing to make the offer and some who will not be, and those who will 
not be are likely to be the ones against whom such consent would be most 
needed. 
3. Standing Offer of Consent to All HSCs in Investment Contract with the 
Host State 
Some investments by foreign entities are undertaken pursuant to signed 
contracts between the investor and the host state. This is usually the case with 
huge infrastructure projects (such as power generation and road construction) 
and exploitation of natural resources such as agricultural land use, forestry, 
logging, hard-rock minerals extraction, and oil and gas extraction. Such pro-
jects are the ones that most often cause harm to HSCs, and therefore, impose a 
                                                                                                                           
tlement. (2) A dispute between a foreign investor and the Government in respect of an 
enterprise to which this Act applies which is not amicably settled through mutual dis-
cussions within six months may be submitted at the option of the aggrieved party to ar-
bitration as follows: a. in accordance with the rules of procedure for arbitration of the 
United Nations Commission of International Trade Law; or b. in the case of a foreign 
investor, within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on investment 
protection to which the Government and the country of which the investor is a national 
are parties; or c. in accordance with any other national or international machinery for 
the settlement of investment dispute agreed to by the parties. 
Id. § 33(1)–(2). 
2018] Making Investment Arbitration Work for All 2871 
need for HSCs to be able to obtain redress. All the examples of harm to HSCs 
cited in Part II above (and many more around the globe not cited in this Essay) 
relate to infrastructure or natural resource exploitation.110 Shell’s gas flaring, 
oil spillages and pollution in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria relates to its ex-
ploitation of petroleum.111 
Those investments involved a contract between the host state and the for-
eign investor. I propose inserting a clause into such contracts under which the 
investor consents to arbitral proceedings initiated by HSCs. Some scholars 
have explained that, in the context of the investor consenting to the host state 
initiating proceedings, “consent . . . typically [is] not a problem” because “the 
contract typically provid[es] for obligations on both sides.”112 The proposal in 
this Essay is that the undertaking of the foreign investor in such a clause would 
be a consent to arbitration initiated by HSCs, in addition to any consent it may 
give to proceedings by the HSG. 
An issue that may arise with respect to some jurisdictions is whether 
HSCs, who are not necessarily privy to the investment contract between the 
investor and the host state can enforce the consent undertaken if the investor 
were to renege on that undertaking and challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal. However, privity is unlikely to pose much of a problem. In many 
common law jurisdictions where this would have been a problem, legislation 
has been enacted to enable third-parties to enforce contracts made for their ben-
efit.113 Beside legislation, courts have used other principles of law (such as 
agency, estoppel, trust, and unjust enrichment) to circumvent the privity issue 
when it has presented a problem.114 The host state may also provide in the con-
                                                                                                                           
110 See supra notes 28–69 and accompanying text. 
111 See Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria Ltd. [2005] 6 AHRLR 151, 152–54 (Nige-
ria). 
112
 THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, supra 
note 1, at 589. 
113 Consultation Paper, Sub-Committee on Privity of Contract Consultation, the Law Reform 
Commission of Hong Kong, Privity of Contract (May 2004), http://www.info.gov.hk/hkreform 
[https://perma.cc/QRR9-WT32]. 
114 See, e.g., Trident Gen. Ins. Co. v. McNiece Bros. Pty. (1988) 165 CLR 107 (Austl.) (resorting 
to various principles, including trust and unjust enrichment, to circumvent the privity problem). In this 
case, McNiece was a contractor for construction work being carried out at a site belonging to Blue 
Circle. Blue Circle had entered into a contract of insurance with Trident, in June 1977, covering the 
works. “The Assured” was defined as “Blue Circle Southern Cement Limited, all its subsidiary, asso-
ciated and related Companies, all Contractors and Sub-Contractors and/or Suppliers.” In 1979, an 
employee of McNiece was seriously injured at the construction site. McNiece was found liable to pay 
damages to the employee. McNiece sought indemnity for the amount from Trident under the insur-
ance policy contracted by Blue Circle. Trident denied liability on the ground that McNiece was not a 
party to the insurance contract. McNiece commenced legal action against Trident. Both the trial judge 
and, on appeal, the NSW Court of Appeal, held in favour of McNiece. Trident’s appeal to the High 
Court of Australia, was dismissed by a majority of five to two. Among the majority, Justice Deane 
explained that McNiece could not claim directly under the insurance contract, but that Blue Circle 
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tract that it acts on its own behalf and on behalf of its citizens. That way the 
HSCs may be deemed to be parties to the contract with the foreign investor. 
What may be more problematic is whether host states would be willing to 
insert such a clause in their contracts with foreign investors. That may be diffi-
cult with HSGs that are oblivious to, or contemptuous of, the plight and rights 
of their citizens. For instance, the action of the Cambodian government in evict-
ing its citizens to make way for KKS and KKP to farm sugarcane on some 
twenty-thousand hectares of land may suggest that the Cambodian government 
would not have been interested in facilitating arbitral proceedings against the 
investor. Similarly, the inaction of successive Nigerian governments, and in 
some cases, complicity of government, may suggest that the government will 
not be interested in facilitating arbitral proceedings against Shell or other in-
vestors. 
A further limitation of consent in contracts is the fact that not all foreign 
investments involve a contract between the investor and the host state. A for-
eign investor may enter a country to acquire or merge with an existing private 
business. It may enter into a joint venture with some private HSCs or may 
commence a wholly-owned investment operation that does not require con-
tracting with the host state. 
Thus, even if host states are willing to obtain foreign investors’ consent to 
arbitration by contract, not all investors and investments would be captured. 
That said, if host states agree to adopt investor consent to arbitrate clauses in 
investment contracts, it would be an effective mechanism for access to arbitra-
tion, and remedy, for HSCs in most of the situations in which they find them-
selves helpless. 
4. Host State Law Deeming Foreign Investor Consent to Arbitrate 
Host states may pass legislation deeming that all foreign investors are 
considered to have consented to international arbitral proceedings initiated by 
its citizens. In such a case, the fact that a foreign enterprise has invested in the 
jurisdiction may trigger the operation of consent; express agreement of the in-
vestor would not be required, as it would be under the investment contract, 
standing offer, or through ad hoc consent. 
                                                                                                                           
held benefit of insurance contract on trust for McNiece. Id. at 149. He suggested that estoppel may 
also have been applicable, but that was not argued. Id. at145–46. Justice Gaudron, on the other hand, 
explained that while McNiece could not claim under the insurance contract, McNiece had an unjust 
enrichment claim against Trident. She held that by accepting consideration for a promise to benefit a 
third-party (in this case McNiece) Trident would be unjustly enriched at the expense of McNiece if the 
promise was not fulfilled. Id. at 176–77; see also JEANNIE PATERSON, ANDREW ROBERTSON & AR-
LEN DUKE, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 268–77 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing various principles of 
law by which the privity problems may be circumvented). 
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This legislative option seems straightforward and would capture all for-
eign investors and investments. There are possible obstacles, however. First, 
the governing law in some jurisdictions may vest adjudication of disputes aris-
ing within the jurisdiction exclusively in the courts established under the gov-
erning law. For instance, 
Chapter III of the [Australian] Constitution establishes the federal 
judicature, and vests it with certain power and jurisdiction . . . [that] 
has long been interpreted as an exhaustive statement of the manner 
in which the judicial power of the Commonwealth can be exercised. 
That is, Chapter III implies a strict separation of the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth from the other branches of the federal gov-
ernment and other kinds of governmental power. This separation is 
effected by . . . interlocking rules . . . [including that] the ‘judicial 
power of the Commonwealth’ can only be exercise by Chapter III 
courts. . . . Though the concept of judicial power defies precise defi-
nition, it is . . . clear that . . . [it] include[s] the power to interpret the 
Constitution, and to decide whether legislative or executive action is 
within power.115 
It is possible then that Australia’s highest court (the High Court of Aus-
tralia) may rule that legislation by Parliament or an executive order that pur-
ports to vest adjudicatory authority of disputes in international arbitral tribu-
nals is beyond the authority of those bodies of government and infringes upon 
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.116  That said, Australia has long ac-
cepted and facilitated international arbitration. Australia is a party to the Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award 1958 
(New York Convention) and the ICSID Convention, and the federal Parliament 
has enacted the International Arbitration Act 1974 to affect these conventions 
in Australian law.117 The many contracting parties to these two conventions are 
likely to be in a similar position. Thus, constitutional limitations are unlikely to 
be a problem. 
What may instead be a problem is the willingness of host states to adopt 
such a law. As was the case with investors’ standing offer to consent in invest-
                                                                                                                           
115 Laryea et al., ISDS and the Australian Constitutional Framework, supra note 3, at 260–62. 
116 The High Court of Australia is the highest and final court in Australia’s judicial system. It is 
this court that interprets and enforces the Australian Constitution. Id. at 265. 
 117 Id. at 267. The International Arbitration Act of 1974 states its objects to include giving “effect 
to Australia’s obligations under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards adopted in 1958 by the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion at its twenty-fourth meeting” and giving “effect to the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States signed by Australia on 24 Mar. 1975.” Id. 
at 267 n.42. 
2874 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2845 
ment contracts, HSGs that are oblivious to the plight and rights of their citizens 
or complicit in perpetrating the harm may also be unwilling to adopt such a 
law.118 If host states can adopt such a law, however, it would be a very effec-
tive mechanism for investor consent and facilitating access to arbitration and 
remedy for HSCs. 
5. Mandatory Domestic Licensing or Authorization Regime Incorporating 
Investor Consent to Arbitrate 
Host states could require, as a matter of domestic law, that all foreign in-
vestors obtain an authorization (or license) to invest in that state. Obtaining au-
thorization to invest in the host state would be contingent upon investors con-
senting to arbitral proceedings both initiated by HSCs and by the HSG. In this 
way, “[s]ubmission to arbitration may be made a condition for admission of 
investments in the host [s]tate.”119 A similar suggestion has been made, albeit 
in the context of the investor consenting to arbitration initiated by the HSG.120  
This mechanism is like the proposal above under host state law deeming 
consent. The main difference is that the investor will know from the onset in 
this case that its investment is admitted to the jurisdiction subject to the terms of 
the authorization, including the investor’s consent to arbitration.  
Like the mechanisms under options (3) and (4) above, though, the limita-
tion would be the willingness of the host state to adopt such a law so as to fa-
cilitate access to arbitral proceedings for its citizens.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has argued that the lack of access to effective remedy for 
HSCs who are harmed by foreign investment in many jurisdictions is a prob-
lem that can be addressed by arbitration or in a future international investment 
court system that may eventuate. Because arbitration is the dominant mecha-
nism for settling international investment disputes, it would be a great fit for 
HSCs seeking a remedy. This can be achieved by expanding the current ISA 
system, which is predominantly used by investors against host states, to be-
come a more inclusive IRDS system that allows all affected persons—
investors and non-investors—whose interests are adversely affected to seek a 
remedy. IRDS would allow for (1) traditional ISA proceedings, in which inves-
tors may initiate proceedings against host states; (2) HGIA, in which HSGs 
                                                                                                                           
118 For a discussion on HSGs’ potential unwillingness to make this change in their contracts with 
foreign investors, see supra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
119 Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 831, 837 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
120 Id. 
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may initiate proceedings against investors; and (3) HCIA, in which HSCs may 
initiate arbitral proceedings against investors. 
This Essay focused on HCIA. If the proposal in this Essay is adopted, it 
will not only address the specific seemingly intractable problem of access to 
remedies for HSCs, but also yield other benefits. These include helping to bal-
ance the rights and interests of all affected parties, enhancing the legitimacy of 
the system that is often called into question, improving the foreign investment 
climate for businesses and states, and working for all. 
I have identified and addressed possible economic and legal arguments 
against implementation of the proposed IRDS. I have identified what I predict 
would be the two main problems: the applicable law and investors’ consent to 
arbitrate. I then suggested means of overcoming those problems. Perhaps the 
most nagging issue is the willingness of governments to implement the pro-
posed solution. 
   
 
